



RMI – Latin America Beyond Borders *Sin Fronteras*

17 February – 2 March 2025
Edition #001



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Probability Yardstick

AnCR (Analytical Confidence Rating)

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Executive Summary



- With the increasing interest shown by the Trump Administration in Latin America, and China's entrenched foreign policy goals in the region – geopolitical conflict is *Almost Certain*. Direct confrontation can be discounted for now, however, the intersection of global rivals *Highly Likely* increases the likelihood that competition in the region could act as a flashpoint to globally destabilizing events soon. The announced revocation of GL 41 in Venezuela will *Almost Certainly* have a significant impact on Maduro's regime.
- A Venezuelan coast guard vessel entered Guyana's EEZ, challenging vessels involved in Guyana's oil industry, marking an escalation in Venezuela's foreign policy toward coercion, intimidation and physical threat. Regional security postures are *Likely* to increase, heightening risk of miscalculation and increasing business risk perception. Sustained operations intending to intimidate and deter corporate entities operating in Guyana's EEZ cannot be discounted at this stage as Venezuela seeks to more forcefully assert its illegal and unfounded claims over the disputed region.
- The ambush of a group of Guyanese Defense Force soldiers by an armed gang on the Venezuelan side of the Cuyuni River underscores the sub-threshold capabilities of the Maduro regime. The attack's coincidence with a significant political date was *Highly Likely* deliberate and was *Highly Unlikely* to have been conducted without Caracas' prior knowledge.
- Eight Mexican cartels, MS-13, and Tren de Aragua have been designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the U.S. State Department. Although U.S. kinetic actions are *Highly Unlikely* at this time, there is an associated risk of reputational damage as well as large fines faced by legitimate businesses that are forced into paying bribes and extortion payments as this is now considered as providing material support to a terrorist organization.
- The Colombian Armed Forces continue to fight against the National Liberation Army in Colombia, although the rebel faction is *Likely* approaching consolidation of control over Catatumbo, a major cocaine-production region. With anti-narcotics high on the Trump Administration's agenda and Venezuelan oil licenses scheduled to be canceled, opportunities abound for the Maduro regime's criminal networks to 'deniably' target a key concern for the U.S. if the renewal of oil licenses cannot be secured by Caracas.
- Suriname's economic outlook appears positive, but systemic challenges persist; political corruption and entrenched transnational organized crime actors *Likely* risk driving instability over the longer term. With elections upcoming in May, the political landscape of Suriname should be monitored closely in addition to enhanced due diligence checks to protect against these risks.

Venezuela & Guyana [Vital Intelligence]




Venezuelan naval incursion into Guyanese EEZ: On 1st March, a Venezuelan coastguard vessel, identified as ABF Wakari, entered Guyana's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), approaching ExxonMobil's FPSO vessel PROSPERITY in the Stabroek Block. ABF Wakari transmitted a radio message asserting it was operating in "disputed international waters" before proceeding towards other offshore facilities, including LIZA DESTINY, which the Venezuelan vessel claimed was operating in Venezuela's EEZ.

In response, Guyanese President Irfaan Ali condemned the incursion as a "grave concern", summoning Venezuela's ambassador and deploying air and naval assets. The U.S. echoed this statement, with the State Department warning that "further provocations will result in consequences for the Maduro regime."

RMI Comment: This incursion marks a deliberate escalation by Venezuela towards Guyana's sovereignty and a direct challenge to the operations of Guyana's oil industry. Venezuela's intimidation of vessels involved in oil extraction within Guyana's EEZ *Almost Certainly* signals Venezuela's intent to move beyond rhetoric towards a more hostile and aggressive posture. This is *Likely* to increase risk perception across the Guyanese economy as the Maduro regime acts with increasing unrestraint, despite pressure from international partners and institutions.

Following the incident, the High Presidential Commission of Essequibo released a video of a naval anti-aircraft gun being fired and a statement that the "FANB is determined to use weapons to defend our people." It is *Highly Unlikely* that this video is directly linked to ABF Wakari's challenges to vessels operating in Guyana's EEZ, though it highlights Venezuela's shift to direct intimidation and coercion towards Guyana's oil industry.

The announced revocation of the U.S. GL-41 oil license is *Likely* the driving force for the shift in Venezuela's approach toward the Essequibo dispute – the amplification of its Essequibo claim has been used, unsuccessfully, in the past to deflect attention from economic challenges. Similar direct confrontations are now a *Realistic Possibility*, Venezuela's decision to exert pressure within Guyana's EEZ increases the risk of miscalculation, a risk which will *Probably* be amplified by the heightened Guyanese & U.S. security response. **Ends.**



Current assessed threat level: **EXTREME**



RMI Recommendation: These actions are a seismic shift in Maduro's foreign policy: moving beyond threats to actual intimidation. Sustained provocations challenging legal operations in Guyanese territory can't be discounted at this stage as Venezuela seeks to assert itself. RMI has considerable provenance in the provision of maritime security solutions, via our Royal Marine and Special Forces staff who have delivered similar in other hostile locations. We have been tracking the probability of this type of activity for many months in Guyana through our LATAM network. Contact us to learn more about our offer. **Ends.**

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Beyond Borders / Sin Fronteras #001

Guyana



Guyanese forces ambushed near the Venezuelan border: On 17th February, six Guyanese Defense Forces (GDF) personnel were attacked during a resupply mission along the Cuyuni River by gunmen on the left bank of the river. Two of the GDF soldiers were reported as being in critical condition following the incident. Shots were exchanged between both sides, but no details are forthcoming on the status of the Venezuelan gunmen. Venezuela's foreign ministry denied involvement on 17th February, declaring the incident a false-flag operation "designed to manipulate public opinion and divert attention from the violations of international law." However, on 19th February, the Venezuelan Attorney General Tarek William Saab opened a criminal investigation, claiming that Venezuela's self-declared, and illegitimate, claim over the Essequibo region provides jurisdiction to investigate crimes in the area.

The attack coincided with the 59th anniversary of the Geneva Agreement (17th February 1966) which outlined a process to resolve the territorial dispute over the Essequibo region between Venezuela and then-British Guiana. Venezuela capitalized on the anniversary, urging Guyana to immediately engage in negotiations over the region, stating that the "fight for the recovery of Guayana Esequiba remains an unwavering cause of the people of Venezuela".

RMI Comment: The bizarre and contradictory backtrack from declaring a false-flag operation to pursuing a legal investigation underscores Venezuela's capacity and willingness to exploit events to amplify its longstanding narratives. Whilst Attorney General Saab's comments were not as directly hostile to Guyana as those often made, the announcement of an investigation reinforces Caracas' line that the Essequibo region is sovereign Venezuelan territory, which is *Highly Likely* more aligned to the wider objectives of Caracas' information operations.

As previously assessed, Venezuela retains the ability to conduct hybrid warfare operations throughout Essequibo through the Maduro regime's access to organized crime networks known to be operating there. Definitive confirmation of this would require sensitive technical government collection assets – but it is *Highly Unlikely* that this attack was conducted without at least prior knowledge, and *Probably* approval and authorization, given the risk of escalation that engaging a sovereign state's security forces poses, as well as the significance of the anniversary of the Geneva Agreement for Venezuela. **Ends.**



Current assessed threat level: **HIGH**



RMI Recommendation: This incident underscores the threat that Venezuelan-backed hybrid actors pose in the Essequibo region. Further incidents across the spectrum of sub-threshold activity are *Likely* in the build-up to the April's election of a regional governor as Caracas attempts to establish a foothold in the region and discredit Guyana's ability to secure the territory. *Highly Likely* as part of its information operation to further Venezuelan 'credibility' to its claims of sovereignty and role as protector of the inhabitants of the Essequibo region. **Ends.**

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Venezuela



Oil concession revoked by President Trump over concerns of repatriation flights: On 26th February, President Trump stated that his administration is planning to “end the oil license granted by the Biden administration to Venezuela, effective 1st March” (*Almost Certainly* GL 41). Announced via Truth Social, President Trump criticized the Maduro regime for violating the conditional terms of the agreement, which granted Chevron permission to extract and sell oil in Venezuela. President Trump also criticized the speed at which Venezuela was accepting deportation flights, despite President Maduro previously affirming Caracas’ commitment to cooperating with the U.S. on this issue. Both President Trump and Secretary of State Rubio have been critical of the Biden administration’s Venezuela policy considering Caracas’ sustained violations of the agreement, with this revocation marking the latest event of heightened U.S. pressure on Venezuela. The six-month GL 41 wind-down period to 1st September will be pivotal...

RMI Comment: The maintenance of GL 41 was a crucial component of the Maduro regime’s survival; the c.\$3.2 billion generated annually from joint ventures enabled the funding required to maintain President Maduro’s autocratic rule. Additionally, the technical expertise significantly uplifted the capacity of Venezuela’s oil industry, which has been hollowed out through corruption, sanctions and mismanagement. The loss of technical support and assistance provided by Chevron which enabled Venezuela’s production to reach over 1 million barrels per day is now set to disappear by the end of July. There remains the *Realistic Possibility* that the license will be renewed; particularly as the Trump administration allowed the license to renew on 1st February following the visit of Trump’s special envoy, Richard Grenell, to discuss Venezuela accepting migrant flights.

If renewal of the license does not materialize, support would *Likely* be available and provided by China, Russia and Iran. However, it is *Highly Unlikely* that these countries would be willing to assist to the extent that Chevron has been doing due to concerns over the *Almost Certain* U.S. reprisals – with China mired in geopolitical confrontation with the U.S. globally, Iran facing similarly stringent sanctions and Russia looking to maintain its upwards trajectory of warming relations with the U.S. to maximally gain from any future outcomes relating to the war in Ukraine. Support from these countries, therefore, would *Likely* be limited to ‘deniable’ transfers of oil and sanctions-evasion mechanisms, rather than overt partnerships to extract oil. **Ends.**



Current assessed threat level: **HIGH**



RMI Recommendation: The ramifications of license revocation are yet to materialize at ICOD, although President Maduro’s recent conciliatory messaging towards President Trump and the importance of oil revenue to Caracas suggest it is *Likely* that President Maduro will continue appeasement attempts, though the stumbling block is *Almost Certain* to remain the acceptance of Venezuelan migrants at a pace which President Trump considers adequate, which has not yet been met. Failing this, there are limited options available to President Maduro – and all are escalatory and push sanctions relief further away. **Ends.**

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Venezuela & Cuba



U.S. to restrict ‘foreign adversaries’ from accessing advanced technology: On 21st February, President Trump issued the America First Investment Policy which aims to limit the grouping of states referred to in the document as ‘foreign adversaries’ – China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia and Venezuela, from accessing American technologies, in particular artificial intelligence (AI). The policy is *Almost Certainly* most directly geared toward China due to its peerless industrial espionage capability. In addition to curbing access to AI, direct investment from China in the U.S. critical national infrastructure (CNI) sectors of food, energy, natural resources, ports etc., will be stopped over national security concerns.

RMI Comment: This is certainly an ‘America First’ policy, demonstrating the U.S.’ prioritization of maintaining strategic technological advantages over its foremost adversary, China. The policy will also *Probably* have wider-reaching implications than curbing Chinese access to AI. Despite U.S. sanctions, China has achieved success in its military AI capabilities – the most recent forthcoming example being a reworking of Meta’s publicly accessible Llama model to gather and process intelligence as well as provide information for operational decision-making. While it is *Almost Certain* that China maintains a network of embedded spies in Western tech companies and academic institutions, the America First Investment Policy will *Highly Likely* degrade access, risking China falling further behind the U.S. in an industry *Highly Likely* poised to be the decisive enabler of modern warfare.

The consequences of the America First Investment Policy for Latin America are expansive: firstly, the economic landscape will *Probably* be further polarized between East and West. With economic security inexorably tied to national security – a belief also held by President Xi Jinping – competition over the economic allegiance of previously balanced states is *Likely* to increase. Secondly, China, supported by ‘foreign adversaries’ Venezuela and Cuba are *Highly Likely* to be sympathetic and willing agents to act on behalf of China in conducting espionage on Western interests operating across South America. Finally, Guyana and Suriname will *Probably* be embroiled most deeply in geopolitical conflict because of the policy, rapidly developing countries with significant a U.S. energy presence, representing valuable targets for retaliation in the form of sabotage as well as espionage to plug the gap *Likely* left because of limited access through the traditional insider threat vector favored by China. **Ends.**



Current assessed threat level: **HIGH**



RMI Recommendation: The *Almost Certain* decline of China-affiliated investment into sensitive U.S. industries will *Highly Likely* deepen the need for China to conduct espionage against American companies. Enhanced due diligence assessments and vetting practices are recommended to understand and mitigate the potential threats you face in Latin America. **Ends.**

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Beyond Borders / Sin Fronteras #001

Mexico & the United States



Designation of drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations: On 19th February, the U.S. State Department officially designated a total of eight Mexican cartels, Tren de Aragua and MS-13 as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). This move marks a significant departure from conventional counter-organized crime measures and represents a broader strategy to disrupt transnational criminal networks through the lens and application of traditional counterterrorism operations, although U.S. kinetic activity remains *Unlikely* for now.

Under the new designation, law enforcement agencies can deploy a wider set of tools ranging from enhanced asset freezes and sanctions to expanded intelligence operations and kinetic strikes against members of the newly designated terrorist organizations, who are now legally classified as enemy combatants, to dismantle these groups' financial and operational structures. Importantly, the designation of FTO and SDGT allows the U.S. administration to designate individuals who provide material support to a terrorist entity as terrorists themselves.

RMI Comment: The legality of drone strikes remains a subject of debate, but they are considered a viable option both congressionally and according to international humanitarian law. However, U.S. drone strikes are *Unlikely* currently, with Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum on 20th February urging the U.S. not to violate Mexican sovereignty “through land, sea or air.” It is *Highly Unlikely* that the U.S. will act unilaterally against Mexican cartels, an act which would *Almost Certainly* degrade U.S. – Mexico relations and with it, existing counter-narcotics operations.

Separately, the designation of cartels as FTOs carries a notable risk to businesses operating in Mexico, as the payment of ‘protection’ through extortion could see legitimate businesses labeled as sponsoring terrorism and subject to large fines. There is an associated benefit to this, with the *Realistic Possibility* that the U.S. would use the designation to levy additional sanctions on Chinese companies involved in the trafficking of fentanyl and its precursors – or even the Chinese Communist Party for its role in materially supporting the activities of terrorism. **Ends.**



Current assessed threat level: **HIGH**



RMI Recommendation: While the immediate ramifications from the designation of cartels as FTOs are *Highly Unlikely* to manifest in a deterioration of the security situation in Mexico, the designation carries significant business and reputational risk due to the pervasiveness of cartel extortion. Consider an overview of business practices to ensure you are compliant if you operate in a high-risk area. **Ends.**

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Colombia



President Petro places Defense Ministry under military control amidst security crisis:

The security crisis in Colombia has escalated significantly, with the National Liberation Army (ELN) intensifying its operations across the country, though incidents have been particularly prominent along the Venezuelan border. Clashes between the ELN and the 33rd Front, a dissident FARC faction, have resulted in significant casualties and mass displacement, prompting President Gustavo Petro to suspend peace negotiations and reassess his administration's security strategy, which has prioritized dialogue with rebel factions. Despite efforts to maintain dialogue, the deterioration of the security environment has reinforced skepticism regarding the viability of President Petro's 'Total Peace' strategy.

The government's response, including the appointment of Colombian Air Force Brigadier General Pedro Sánchez as Minister of Defense on 20th February, signals the *Highly Likely* shift toward a more traditional counter-insurgency approach. However, concerns persist on the departure from the democratic custom that has been upheld since 1991 of not appointing military personnel to the position of Minister of Defense.

RMI Comment: The recent wave of violence driven primarily by the ELN has seen various cities across Colombia targeted by small arms attacks and explosives. In Bogotá, public locations have been targeted by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in addition to the targeting of police and military installations across the country as instability has proliferated beyond Catatumbo, a major cocaine-producing region where fighting has been most fierce, and *Highly Likely* remains the main effort of both the ELN and the Military Forces of Colombia.

As of 25th February, ELN is *Likely* approaching a period of consolidation of its control over Catatumbo, which it has contested since 2016. It is *Highly Unlikely* that President Petro's Total Peace initiative's focus on dialogue will compel ELN to negotiate or cede territory. When combined with the recent appointment of a CAF general as Minister of Defense, it is *Highly Likely* that destabilizing violence will increase in the near term (1-3 months) as Colombia seeks to dismantle the ELN's control of the cocaine supply chain in Catatumbo. **Ends.**



Current assessed threat level: **EXTREME**



RMI Recommendation: Given the assessment that violence is *Highly Likely* to increase over the next 1-3 months as the Military Forces of Colombia adopt a more militarized approach to countering ELN and the recent uptake in violence across the country, the current assessed threat level is EXTREME. Travel is not recommended in the immediate term as the security situation worsens. **Ends.**

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Beyond Borders / Sin Fronteras #001

Brazil



Foreign Minister pushes for deeper multilateralism through BRICS bloc: On 25th February, during the opening speech of the BRICS *sherpas* meeting, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mauro Vieira, called for greater participation in global decisions by the Global South, as well as stronger multilateralism. Questioning the effectiveness of the current international order, BRICS members will hold discussions that intend to “redefine global governance to reflect the realities of the 21st century” – a clear challenge to the U.S.-led international order that has promoted Western interests since the Second World War. The BRICS meeting follows a period of tension between the U.S. and Brazil over the U.S.’ protectionist policies and deportation flights.

RMI Comment: Aligning with the core narrative of BRICS – that the Global South is marginalized by the current international system – Foreign Minister Vieira’s positioning of BRICS as a challenge against the Western-dominated structure of global governance is bolstered by the recent expansion of the bloc to include the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Iran and Indonesia. Dominated by the political power of Russia and China, BRICS serves as a strategic platform for alternative economic and diplomatic alignments, offering Latin America a vehicle to push back against U.S. economic pressure and trade policies.

Foreign Minister Vieira’s remarks underscore Brazil’s intent to deepen ties with emerging economies, reducing dependency on Western institutions and strengthening Global-South cooperation. However, the effectiveness of BRICS in reshaping the global order remains uncertain, given internal fractures – such as tension between China and India, divergent economic policies – and a lack of institutional enforcement mechanisms (like the United Nations and other international institutions). For Latin America, greater BRICS engagement *Almost Certainly* provides increased access to non-Western financing, energy partnerships, and alternative trade routes, but the long-term geopolitical consequences are *Highly Likely* to strain regional alignment with Washington. As Brazil asserts itself within BRICS leadership, the U.S. - Brazil relationship will *Likely* continue to fluctuate, particularly if Brasilia moves toward de-dollarization efforts, which has long been a BRICS priority lacking meaningful progress or expanded security cooperation with China and Russia. **Ends.**



Current assessed threat level: **LOW**



RMI Recommendation: Brazil’s position at the helm of BRICS for 2025 will be of significant regional importance this year given that the group’s inherent anti-Western objectives will *Highly Likely* threaten to destabilize relations with the U.S., progress towards pro-BRICS agendas and policy decisions are *Highly Unlikely* to come fast, however. Close monitoring to inform decision-making is recommended. **Ends.**

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Beyond Borders / Sin Fronteras #001

Suriname




Surinamese economic outlook is positive, though challenges remain: Staatsolie is seeking \$1.5bn in bank financing to fund its share of the Gran Morgu energy project, led by TotalEnergies and APA. With Suriname's economic outlook buoyed by the discovery of offshore oil deposits and stabilized finances through International Monetary Fund support, its economy is forecast to increase 55% in 2028, when block 58 comes online. Issues remain however, with Suriname's Finance and Planning Minister Stanley Raghoebarsing warning that Suriname must "insulate management of oil wealth from political influence" in addition to avoiding unsustainability which he explained "threatens economic backsliding and rising inflation".

Compounding these economic risks is the issue of organized crime and corruption – with criminal networks historically destabilizing and subverting government and economic institutions. While the opportunity presented by the Gran Morgu project is huge, there are considerable and tangible risks that are *Highly Likely* to be exploited by transnational criminal actors active within Suriname.

RMI Comment: It is Almost Certain that Staatsolie will meet its financing goal for its share of the Gran Morgu project. Additionally, it is *Unlikely* that organized crime will directly impact offshore oil extraction operations, but sporadic clashes over the maintenance of control of key cocaine trafficking routes into French Guyana cannot be discounted as transnational groups seek to maintain the flow of narcotics into Europe. However, a surging economy driven by oil revenue will *Likely* precipitate political instability if corruption persists. Overall, Suriname is poised to face similar issues to neighboring Guyana, but Suriname's longer-term stability is *Likely* more firmly challenged by corruption and organized crime – with the consequences *Probably* exacerbated by a surging oil economy. **Ends.**

RMI Recommendation: Continual monitoring of Suriname's geopolitical risk and regulatory landscape is essential as the Gran Morgu energy project progresses. Proactive risk assessments should be conducted to understand the full spectrum of risks, including political instability (with elections upcoming in May 2025 *Highly Likely* to decisively shape Suriname's immediate future), regulatory shifts and organized crime dynamics. Tailored enhanced due diligence investigations and intelligence reports sourced from in-country sources will be critical to identifying emerging risks. **Ends.**



Current assessed threat level: **MODERATE**



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Beyond Borders / Sin Fronteras #001

Argentina



Presidential crypto scandal exposed, calls for impeachment: On 15th February, reports emerged detailing how the LIBRA cryptocurrency scam was directly linked to Argentinian President Javier Milei. The incident has led to a severe credibility crisis for President Milei, with the opposition intensifying calls for his impeachment as they argue that the fiasco is emblematic of broader systemic mismanagement. Additionally, over 100 criminal complaints have been filed against President Milei and other parties involved in the scandal.

Amid mounting domestic pressure, President Milei's decision to recently travel to the U.S. has increased scrutiny, fueling speculation from the opposition that the president is avoiding direct engagement over allegations of knowingly committing what is known as a 'rug pull': an act of fraud where a cryptocurrency with no value is promoted and then rapidly sold as prices soar, losing money for those without insider information. A total value of \$4.4 billion was erased during the rug pull.

RMI Comment: Public confidence in President Milei has been significantly undermined by the LIBRA scandal, though it is *Highly Unlikely* that this incident will have serious direct political implications for President Milei. This comes as the political landscape in Argentina is strained – with the opposition Judicialist Party President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's selection of candidates proposed for the legislative elections in October being challenged by the Buenos Aires mayor, Axel Kicillof.

Disruption in the opposition, while *Probably* spurring acts of domestic political dissatisfaction, will *Likely* help maintain favorable poll results for President Milei, which currently has President Milei's La Libertad Avanza in the lead. This is despite 80% of Argentinians believing that President Milei's economic policies are being paid for by the people. **Ends.**

RMI Recommendation: The political situation is *Highly Likely* to become increasingly turbulent as the election in October nears. For now, President Milei's position is supported by a divided opposition and key support from the U.S., monitoring of the issue is recommended to maintain awareness of the potential fallouts from political instability and *Likely* organized protests and civil disobedience. **Ends.**



Current assessed threat level: **LOW**



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
Latin America & China

Chinese expansion throughout Latin America – a cause for concern?: With the scope of this reporting focusing on Latin America, it is worthwhile to consider the implications of Chinese presence across Latin America in this first edition of ‘Beyond Borders’. Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are major investors in the region’s energy, infrastructure and space industries. Maritime and infrastructure development has been the centerpiece of Chinese investment, enhancing Chinese economic and military access into the U.S.’ sphere of influence – with specific sites in Cuba acting as signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection bases against U.S. space and missile activity.

Most recently, China’s influence over the operation of the Panama Canal was criticized by President Trump and Secretary of State Rubio. While this has since diminished, China’s presence throughout Latin America and the Caribbean is *Almost Certain* to continue, representing a major threat to the interests of the Trump administration, which has shown a willingness to exert its influence in the region that was perhaps less visible in previous administrations.

RMI Comment: There is a *Remote Chance* that Latin American states are willing, or will be willing in the future, to entirely shift their diplomatic and political alignment away from the U.S., however, China’s economic strategy has *Highly Likely* created a geopolitical environment where political alignment is not automatic; support for Chinese interests in multilateral forums is underpinned by China’s observer status in the Organization of American States (OAS) and Latin American states overwhelmingly support China’s position towards Taiwan, for instance.

This represents a diplomatic, economic and political challenge for Western interests in the region – with China reaping political rewards for its economic involvement, it *Almost Certainly* challenges the regional status quo, thereby eroding the status of the U.S. by presenting itself as a viable and credible alternative. China’s expansion of ports across Latin America deepens the significance of its influence in the region; continued dual-use infrastructure development in line with Chinese global strategy is *Almost Certain* to continue, including the development of telecommunications networks and ‘cooperation’ in the space domain. **Ends.**



Current assessed threat level: **MODERATE**

RMI Recommendation: The primary risk from China’s footprint across Latin America is corporate espionage. Although there is minimal risk of physical confrontation, there is a *Realistic Possibility* that strategic competition between the U.S. and China could create an environment that deters investment and opportunities over the longer term, though stability is in the interests of both. **Ends.**

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
CARICOM

Gang and gun violence should be considered acts of terrorism: On 21st February, Jamaica Prime Minister Andrew Holness urged Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member states to adopt a stronger stance on incidents of gang violence, stating that they “must now be regarded as acts of terrorism” during the closing press conference of the 48th Meeting of the Conference of CARICOM Leaders. This shift underscores the severity of the threat organized crime poses to regional stability and states’ abilities to govern.

The move seeks to provide law enforcement with enhanced legal tools, allowing for stricter penalties and increased regional cooperation to dismantle criminal networks. This classification aims to disrupt the operational capabilities of gangs by aligning penalties with counter-terrorism legislation, facilitating cross-border intelligence sharing, and enabling the seizure of financial assets linked to organized crime.

RMI Comment: The strategy has provoked mixed reactions across the region; while economic leaders support stringent measures to restore security, concerns persist within the tourism sector regarding potential reputational damage. However, a reduction in the level of gang violence will *Highly Likely* create a more attractive investment environment, should regional governments succeed in tackling organized crime – balance is necessary in reducing violent crime alongside preserving the region’s image as a stable and secure destination for tourists. Furthermore, the effectiveness of this initiative will *Almost Certainly* depend on the capacity to address the underlying factors that are fueling violent organized crime; an element which was absent from Prime Minister Holness’ statement.

The reclassification of gang violence as terrorism would mark a significant policy evolution, reflecting a growing consensus that traditional policing strategies have failed to contain violent organized crime across the region. The epicenters of organized crime across Latin America *Almost Certainly* fuel violent crime in adjacent states, creating de facto criminal satellite states, whose territory is used to support of larger criminal supply chains. An important step for security, designating violent actors as terrorists is *Highly Unlikely* to meaningfully reduce the levels of criminality across Latin America and the Caribbean. **Ends.**



Current assessed threat level: **MODERATE**



RMI Recommendation: With security at the forefront of CARICOM’s leadership, understanding the dynamics and structures of organized crime throughout the region is essential. Consider monitoring services to identify trends and risks associated with organized crime throughout the region. **Ends.**

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RMI Security Services in LATAM

Our offer: We have an exceptional network across LATAM and provenance in supporting clients across the Security & Risk Management spectrum in the region. Our capability is underpinned by an exceptional intelligence network that gets to heart of the complex and complicated security challenges seen across every country – we are proud to operate *Beyond Borders / Sin Fronteras* and believe that our offerings in Security Risk Management, Medical and HSE sets us apart from our competitors.

Last week we enjoyed meeting many of your representatives at the Guyana Energy and Supply Chain Expo in Georgetown to discuss all our capabilities and share insights on developing threats in the region, and how they might be mitigated. We look forward to returning to the region at the SEOGS expo in Paramaribo, Suriname in June where we would hope to have similar discussions.

Our office and experts at RMI-Guyana are available 24/7 to provide advice locally and regionally. They are supported by colleagues based in the U.S. and UK, all drawing on our network operating across LATAM and the Caribbean. We have developed an integrated information network in Guyana to share insights and threats in near real-time across that part of the region and offer Security Risk Management advice to many operators in Guyana. Do have your teams reach out to our Country Manager to learn more.




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Reach out to us at intel@rmiglobalsolutions.com to learn more about our security and intelligence solutions or to explore this topic in greater detail.

Probability Yardstick



Analytical Confidence Rating (AnCR)

HIGH. Uncertainties remaining should have negligible or no effect on the key judgement(s).

MODERATE. Uncertainties remain that could expose the key judgements to change.

LOW. Critical uncertainties remain that could invalidate the key judgements.

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